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In this paper, we propose that performance under uncertainty and ambiguity is enabled
by a two-pronged set of practices enacted by leaders and frontline workers. These
contextualized practices fuel performance by enabling teams and organizations to both
discern, interpret and make sense of important discrepancies as situations unfold (what
we refer to as anomalizing), and to develop a richer understanding of a situation (what
we call proactive leader sensemaking). Together, these situation-specific practices
contextualize engagement and promote capabilities to contingently tailor actions to
unfolding conditions. We test our hypotheses using data gathered from a sample of
wildland firefighters and find strong support for our theorizing.We also identify a set of
additional group and situational conditions that provide a more nuanced understanding
of factors that contribute to reliable performance under dynamic uncertainty.Together,
the findings provide quantitative evidence for the micro-foundations of effective perfor-
mance in uncertain contexts.
1. Introduction
Almost all theories of organization highlight thenecessity for organizations to adapt in the face of
uncertainty (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 1967;
Thompson, 1967). Uncertainty, often experienced as a
sense of doubt or inadequate understanding that arises
from the ambiguity or equivocality of inputs (Lipshitz &
Strauss, 1997), can confuse or delay actions. In high-risk
settings, this can have large and deadly consequences.
Uncertainty shapes the extent to which work behav-
iours and task requirements can be formalized rather
than left to emerge through adaptive and proactive
behaviours. In certain contexts, work activities can be
accomplished through the use of systematic, routine,
rational, bureaucratic procedures, whereas uncertain
conditions require more flexible, experimental and
improvisational approaches. Bureaucratic routines can
be both efficient and effective under conditions of rela-
tive certainty. Uncertainty, however, requires alterna-
tive, interpersonal, high bandwidth coordinating
mechanisms (Gittell, 2002). Moreover, when contextual
uncertainty is exceptionally high and one cannot
imagine or anticipate action interdependencies and
contingencies, organizations and their members may
face uncertainty not only about future realities, but also
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uncertainty about the current state of events. Dynamic
and complex situations often create a state of equivo-
cality or ambiguity – in which data are unclear and
subject to multiple interpretations (Weick, 2001). The
uncertainty challenge in such environments is one of
sensemaking. That is, organizations need to develop
interactive practices and processes that enable ways of
thinking and acting to make sense of the ambiguity and
facilitate swift, coordinated action. In this paper, we
explore the dual process of how leaders help shape the
context and model how to make sense in such circum-
stances through proactive sensemaking as well as how
those on the frontline actually attend to weak signals
through processes of anomalizing (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2006).
Our theorizing builds from research exploring the
dynamics of high reliability organizing (Roberts, 1990;
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld,
1999) as well as studies of extreme actions teams (e.g.,
Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006) and fast response
organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). High reliability
organizations (HROs) strive to continuously manage
ambiguity, complexity and fluctuations by sustaining
attention or watchfulness. HROs are adaptive
organizational forms for uncertain and ambiguous envi-
ronments (Weick et al., 1999, 82). They have unique
capabilities to dynamically organize, which enables
organizational actors both to make sense of uncertainty
and ambiguity as events unfold and to flexibly respond.
Research over the past decade (see Vogus et al.,
2007a; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007b; Vogus & Welbourne,
2003;Roe & Schulman, 2008;Madsen, Desai, Roberts, &
Wong, 2006; Roberts, Madsen, Desai, & Van Stralen,
2005) has examined the broad organizing principles
through which reliable performance in uncertain and
ambiguous contexts is achieved.But,much less is known
about the micro-level behaviours that underlie dynamic
and adaptive organizing. Our goal in this paper is to
remedy this gap and particularly attend to micro-level
adaptive and proactive behaviours that facilitate coor-
dination and reliable performance when uncertainty is
high.We propose that the foundation of dynamic and
adaptive organizing (which ultimately results in better
performance) stems from the contextualized engage-
ment of actors at multiple organizational levels (Faraj
et al., 2006). Specifically, we hypothesize that effective
performance is enabled when frontline employees
actively strive to capture discriminatory contextual
details and build coherent interpretations of them
(anomalizing), and, when leaders proactively exhibit
behaviours aimed at comprehensive and continuous
sensemaking (proactive leader sensemaking). We test
our hypotheses in the context of wildland firefighting, a
context in which surprises can be deadly, and making
adjustments to ongoing action before they can turn into
a tragic flaw (Perin, 2005) is critical.
2. Conceptual framework and
hypotheses
2.1. Foundations of high performance under
uncertainty
Performance in uncertain contexts is a situation-
specific accomplishment that involves managing contra-
dictions and interruptions (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009;
Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Weick,
2011; Weick et al., 1999). Organizations that strive for
highly reliable performance provide a template for
understanding how this is accomplished. HROs face
special problems of learning and acting in the face of
ambiguity because of risky technologies or work pro-
cesses that are not fully comprehended and continuous
exposure to dynamic contingencies. The patterns of
organizing visible in HROs, serve to ‘induce a rich
awareness of discriminatory detail and a capacity for
action’ (Weick et al., 1999,p.88).Mindful infrastructures
(Weick et al., 1999) guard against misspecifying,
misestimating and misunderstanding things (Schulman,
2004; Vogus et al., 2007b). That is, by increasing an
organization-wide sense of vulnerability, mindful infra-
structures mitigate production pressures that can
otherwise exacerbate the tendency to normalize or
overlook discrepancies signalling that things are
unraveling.Thus,HROs can quickly discover,make sense
of and correct minor perturbations that can build and
cause major disruptions.
There is growing evidence of the salutary effects of
these broad patterns of mindful organizing on reliable
performance (e.g., Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Madsen
et al., 2006; Rerup, 2009; Roberts et al., 2005; Vogus
et al., 2007a, 2007b). For example, Vogus et al. (2007a,
2007b) studied the relationship between mindful organ-
izing practices and the commission of medication
errors in hospital nursing units finding that fewer medi-
cation errors occurred over the subsequent 6 months
on units with higher levels of mindful organizing.These
studies provide a strong foundation, but lack a detailed
examination of the micro-level behaviours by which
leaders and frontline employees process organizational
conditions under uncertainty.We develop how leaders
and frontline employees do this in the following section.
2.2. Processes of contextualized engagement
Managing uncertainty and ambiguity requires attention
and alertness, but it also requires discernment, under-
standing what emerging cues signify, interpreting
changes in those cues and determining how behaviours
can be adjusted in response. Discernment, in part,
means that people appreciate the meaning or signifi-
cance of data elements (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, &
Woods, 2005, p. 20). But, the meaning of data changes as
context changes, which means that ‘important signals’
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change as the details of the current situation change
(Sutcliffe & Weick, 2008).
Organizations that operate effectively under uncer-
tainty balance these adjustments by simultaneously
engaging different parts of the system (Klein et al., 2006;
Weick, 2011). By dynamically blending actions of super-
visors and frontline staff, HROs continuously adjust to
create a more coherent understanding of what they
face and a more composite response (Barton et al.,
2009; Roe et al., 2008; Weick, 2011). This requires
contextualized behaviours at both levels. The frontline
has access to concrete situational details, what Baron
and Misovich (1999) call knowledge by acquaintance,
whereas leadership has knowledge by description,
which fuels broader understanding and action options
(Weick, 2011, p. 23). Description is essential for
sensemaking and organizing, but acquaintance is critical
for successfully navigating ambiguity and dynamism.The
implication is that to manage and respond to highly
dynamic and uncertain contexts, organizations must
have processes in place that interrupt the momentum
of ongoing events, thereby providing space and means
for renewed awareness and sensemaking (Barton et al.,
2009). Such processes presumably enable organizations
to interrupt current frames and to notice, interpret and
coordinate around new or different conditions as they
unfold. In the following paragraphs, we develop hypoth-
eses regarding both aspects of this dual process –
frontline employee anomalizing and proactive leader
sensemaking.
2.2.1. Anomalizing
Previous research suggests that untoward events and
crises are often foreshadowed by small discrepancies
and anomalies that signal that events are not unfolding
as planned (e.g., Turner, 1976). Such anomalies are criti-
cal signals that the system is breaking down (Rerup,
2009; Sutcliffe & Christianson, 2011; Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007).Yet, particularly, when there are performance and
production pressures, there is a tendency to ignore or
normalize such signals (Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005;
Vaughan, 1996). Consequently, to perform effectively
under uncertainty requires organizational members to
be vigilant to anomalies and treat them as critical indi-
cators of potential, emergent problems, rather than as
normal.We use the term anomalizing to mean taking
proactive steps to become alert to discrepancies, to
understand them more completely, and to be less
encumbered by history (Sutcliffe et al., 2011; Weick
et al., 2007). In other words, anomalizing involves both
noticing discrepancies and perturbations as well as
actively working to understand them without simplify-
ing them into familiar categories.The more people hold
on to differences, nuances, discrepancies and outliers,
the more slowly they normalize the details and the
more nuanced and fine-grained an understanding they
can create. More detailed understanding of anomalies
also enables discrepant events to be acted upon more
precisely and swiftly, before becoming unmanageable.
Anomalizing, however, is not just a passive process.
Anomalies can be created as well as noticed. For
example, Barton et al. (2009) found that frontline fire-
fighters created anomalies by collecting diverse per-
spectives on a fire in two ways. First, by taking a
different perspective (e.g., by moving from the ground
to elevation), firefighters deliberately created more
than one interpretation of ongoing events – a kind of
discrepancy that prompted a review of current assump-
tions and actions. Second, firefighters also sought out
different perspectives by engaging with others who had
different expertise or levels of experience. These
actions contribute to more effective performance
under uncertainty by creating a more accurate and
complete picture of unfolding conditions.This consist-
ent and disciplined revising of one’s understanding
means that surprises like those that overwhelmed fire-
fighters at Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993), South Canyon
(Weick, 1995) and Cerro Grande (Weick et al., 2007)
are less likely to occur and, if they do, be managed more
swiftly. Therefore, we hypothesize that when frontline
employees (e.g., firefighters) in uncertain contexts avoid
the tendency to normalize by deliberately seeking,
encouraging, and welcoming the noticing and discern-
ment of anomalies, they will perform better.
Hypothesis 1: Anomalizing will be positively associated
with organizational performance.
2.2.2. Proactive leader sensemaking
Anomalizing is an active approach to managing uncer-
tain contexts.As such, it can be facilitated or hindered
by other organizational factors. In particular, leaders
play a critical role in creating and maintaining a context
for anomalizing.Through their behaviour, leaders com-
municate to group members fundamental assumptions
about the situation and the appropriate processes for
managing it. Specifically, leaders are in a position to
frame the situation as uncertain and dynamic, and thus
worthy of greater vigilance and exploration. Their
behaviour also models the accepted approaches to
managing such situations.Thus,when leaders proactively
inquire and seek to make sense of potential problems,
differences of perspective or other discrepancies, they
send two messages. First, by proactively directing atten-
tion to sensemaking leaders signal that there is no one
right answer or perspective on the situation. By encour-
aging divergent thinking, the leader presents the situa-
tion as uncertain – as something still to be understood.
Second, by seeking out diverse perspectives and
encouraging people to bring up problems or different
viewpoints, leaders model how such ambiguity is to be
managed. By encouraging group members to share with
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the leader (not just among themselves), the leader not
only signals the importance of voice, but also forces
him/herself to be constantly faced with the question
‘what’s the story now?’ Research shows that frontline
employees often notice anomalies and discrepancies
and have divergent perspectives, but they often fail to
voice their concerns to others (e.g., Barton et al., 2009;
Blatt, Christianson, Sutcliffe, & Rosenthal, 2006; Weick
et al., 2007). Voice by itself is important in uncertain
environments particularly for surfacing discrepant cues.
But, a secondary benefit of ‘voice’ is that it triggers the
integration of information and renewed sensemaking in
leaders. Consequently, it enables more effective action
taking. If group members only tell each other and it
never gets to leaders and other decision makers, these
people in power are unable to use the data in their
own sensemaking. For example, Weick (2011, p. 22)
describes how Paul Gleason, a renowned fire super-
intendent, privileged sensemaking practices over
decision-making practices. As Gleason explained, he
wanted to create a dynamic, flexible context to enable
all to be able to cope with a changing fire environment
(Weick, 2011, p. 22). This line of thinking leads us to
hypothesize that proactive leader sensemaking in uncer-
tain contexts is positively associated with performance.
Hypothesis 2: Proactive leader sensemaking will be
positively associated with performance.
2.3. Contextual and organizational factors
Within an inherently uncertain context, like wildland
firefighting, organizational actors may experience addi-
tional sources of uncertainty that particularly affect the
complexity and ambiguity of unfolding events and might
influence their behaviour and performance. Three
sources of such uncertainty are noteworthy: goal clarity
(Locke, Saari, Shaw, & Latham, 1981), group familiarity
(e.g., Goodman & Leyden, 1991), and task interdepend-
ence (Murphy & Jackson, 1999).Although we consider
these sources of uncertainty as boundary conditions
and include them as control variables, we theorize
about them to build a more nuanced understanding of
factors that affect the management of uncertainty and
unfolding events.
Even when the environment overall is uncertain, in
any given situation organizations vary with respect to
the clarity of their immediate goals. Goal clarity is criti-
cal to coordinating in times of uncertainty because goals
direct and focus attention and action (Locke et al.,
1981). Moreover, goals are a target against which to
measure and make sense of current performance. In the
absence of clear goals, organizational actors may strug-
gle to analyse progress with the result that coordination
and predictability likely suffer.
Individuals in general and wildland firefighters specifi-
cally have to work together to accomplish the goals of
the organization.The effectiveness of these collectives
depends, in large part, on their ability to coordinate and
leverage the knowledge and expertise of their members
(Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Rulke & Galaskiewicz, 2000).
When group members know one another well, they are
better able to anticipate each other’s actions, commu-
nicate the nature of the task, and make use of the skills
and expertise on their team. However, when group
members do not know one another, uncertainty
increases as the unfamiliarity introduces an additional
source of ambiguity and unpredictability.
Finally, task interdependence – the extent to which
individuals or units depend on each other to accomplish
their tasks – varies according to the structure of the
organization and the nature of the task (Thompson,
1967).Task interdependence affects performance under
uncertainty by adding complexity to unfolding events,
increasing the need for coordination and creating addi-
tional uncertainty as a result.
3. Method
3.1. Research context
We studied wildland firefighting – an uncertain context
in which attention to discriminatory detail is essential
to performance.Wildland firefighting involves a range
of fire management efforts, including extinguishing
unwanted wildfires (suppression), purposefully setting
controlled fires to burn off hazardous fuels such as
excess undergrowth (prescribed fires) and overseeing,
but not interfering with naturally occurring wildfires,
also as a means of reducing hazardous fuels (wildland
fire use).These three types of efforts are overseen by a
team of individuals structured within a formal hierarchy,
called an incident command system.
An incident commander (IC; or a ‘Burn Boss’ in the
case of prescribed fires) generally leads the incident
command team and has full responsibility for managing
the fire response. In larger fires, individuals responsible
for planning, operations, finance, logistics and safety
assist the IC, whereas in smaller fires, the IC handles all
of these functions. In addition, there are unit-level
leaders responsible for a specific group, such as an
engine crew or ground crew.These unit leaders report
to the head of operations (and ultimately to the IC). In
larger fires, additional levels of oversight may be added.
For example, crew bosses will report to division super-
visors who in turn report to the head of operations.
Wildland firefighting is a highly uncertain context, as
fires move rapidly and unpredictably, their behaviour
and intensity varying with rapidly changing wind,
weather and fuel conditions. In addition, a huge variety
of human resources (including fire analysts, smoke
jumpers, frontline fighters, safety and public relations
officers) and physical resources (from shovels to air-
craft) must be distributed, coordinated and effectively
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utilized. In addition to environmental uncertainty, teams
and units experience varying amounts of goal clarity
and familiarity (e.g., units comprised of individuals from
different states with little to no knowledge of one
another’s capabilities).
3.2. Data collection and sample
The primary data used to test our hypotheses were
gathered from a sample of wildland firefighters who
were involved in US fire management ‘on the ground’.
The management of fire involves many people in a wide
variety of organizations, a large number of whom
provide critical infrastructure, planning and support but
do not physically become involved in a fire incident on
the ground. Much of the work of fire management
occurs long before any flames are seen. However, since
we were interested in the ongoing action of managing a
fire on the ground under uncertain and changing con-
ditions, we chose to focus exclusively on the activities
of people who are called upon to physically manage or
suppress a fire.The survey population included perma-
nent seasonal and full-time employees filling primary
fire positions (including fire, fuels, dispatch and fire avia-
tion) in the USDA Forest Service (USFS) and US DOI
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National Park
Service (NPS). Because sampling was necessarily con-
ducted using day job positions, but the research ques-
tions relate to incident positions, we defined our initial
sampling frame by agency and day job, then coded
responses for analysis based on the incident position
respondents provided as part of the survey.
3.3. Procedure
We collected the data using a telephone survey. We
drew a stratified random sample of administrative units
from complete lists of USFS Forests, BLM State Offices
and NPS Parks with fire programs to reflect the relative
proportions of federal fire personnel. Proportions were
based on a target of 700 surveys: 400 USFS employee
respondents (57%), 200 BLM respondents (29%) and
100 NPS respondents (14%).Major units (such as parks,
national forests, state offices) were randomly selected,
and where multiple subunits occurred for a given major
unit (such as multiple ranger districts on a national
forest), these were again randomly sampled and com-
plete telephone lists of permanent fire employees (full-
time and seasonal) were obtained for the head office
and selected local unit. Individual respondents were
randomly selected from these lists to reflect the rela-
tive proportions of fire personnel in each administrative
level: 57% of surveys from ground-level, 29% from mid-
level and 14% from upper level positions.
The survey was administered by telephone by the
University of Montana’s Bureau of Business and Eco-
nomic Research. After asking for basic demographic
data, we asked respondents to think back to their most
recent fire event.The dates of these events ranged from
the day of the interview to 6 months earlier; most
occurred within 2 or 3 months of the interview.
Respondents provided basic data about the fire event,
the size of the fire and the location. They were then
asked to respond to a series of questions about their
experiences on the fire, using Likert-type scales. For
questions relating to a respondent’s perceptions about
his or her work crew, respondents were asked to ‘con-
sider the people with whom you interacted most fre-
quently (e.g., your unit)’ and to answer the questions as
they related to this particular group.
We obtained usable data from 518 out of 700
respondents, with a response rate of 74%.Thirty-seven
per cent of respondents worked for the US Park
Service, 24% worked for the BLM and 39% worked for
the USFS. Seventy-nine per cent of respondents were
male, the average age was 41 years (ranging between 22
and 65) and average experience in fire management was
16 years (ranging from 1 to 45).
3.4. Analyses
We created indices to assess the key variables. Meas-
ures of all variables were constructed by taking the
average of survey items rated on a 5-point Likert-type
scale. Performance was measured using four items
(Cronbach’s alpha = .62, sample item ‘Overall, how well
did you feel this fire was managed’). It is important to
note that respondents acted as key informants rating
overall performance on the fire, not their own perfor-
mance on the fire (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, &
Sutcliffe, 1990). Proactive leader sensemaking was
measured using eight items (Cronbach’s alpha = .89,
sample item ‘My boss encouraged people to bring up
potential problems’). Anomalizing was measured using
five items (Cronbach’s alpha = .78, sample item ‘We
actively looked for instances of small things going wrong
to try to learn what was happening’). Please seeAppen-
dix for full list of proactive leader sensemaking and
anomalizing items. Given that these measures as well as
some of our control variables were newly developed
for this study, we conducted exploratory factor analysis
with oblique rotation and found that all items cleanly
loaded onto the appropriate factor with no cross-
loadings higher than .3.
In our analyses, we also controlled for the internal
sources of uncertainty described earlier as well as indi-
vidual, crew and fire characteristics likely to influence
performance. We controlled for the survey respond-
ent’s years of experience in fire management as well as
their gender (1 = male, 0 = female). Because of the
skewed nature of this measure, we took the natural
logarithm. We controlled for the familiarity among
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members of the firefighting crew using two survey
items (Cronbach’s alpha = .84, sample item ‘How well
did you know the skills and abilities of this group?’), used
three items to measure the clarity of their goals
(Cronbach’s alpha = .78, sample item ‘Our mission and
objectives for each day were clear throughout the day’),
and three items to assess their level of task interde-
pendence (Cronbach’s alpha = .68, sample item ‘The
way each person performed their work had a significant
impact on how others were able to perform their
work’). We also used a series of dummy variables to
control for the survey respondent’s role (categories
included ‘command and general staff’, ‘ground supervi-
sor’, ‘ground individual’ and ‘support’. ‘Command and
general’ staff was the omitted category) and the fire
type (e.g., wildland, prescribed or suppression) with
wildland as the omitted category.
4. Results
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics as well as correla-
tions among all the variables in the study. Most notably,
and as expected, anomalizing and proactive leader
sensemaking were highly correlated (r = .55). However,
the exploratory factor analysis suggests that these are
actually distinct constructs. In addition, we also exam-
ined variance inflation factors and found that they were
all less than 2.5 further suggesting that multicollinearity
is not a problem (Chatterjee & Price, 1991).
We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical ordi-
nary least squares regression (see Table 2). We first
entered the control variables and found that crews with
higher levels of familiarity with each other (β = .06,
p < .001) and greater goal clarity (β = .43,p < .001) were
associated with more positive assessments of perfor-
mance. We also found that supervisors (β = −.15,
p < .01) and firefighters on the ground (β = −.21,
p < .05) assessed performance less positively than com-
manders, a finding consistent with other research sug-
gesting that top leaders in contrast to frontline workers
often have a more positive view of performance. The
regressions analyses provide support for Hypothesis 1.
Anomalizing was positively associated with perfor-
mance when entered alone (β = .17, p < .001, model 2)
or with proactive leader sensemaking (β = .09, p < .05,
model 4). Supporting Hypothesis 2, we found that pro-
active leader sensemaking was positively associated
with performance when entered alone (β = .20,
p < .001,model 3) or with anomalizing (β = .16,p < .001,
model 4). Taken together, this constitutes strong
support for our hypotheses and provides evidence for
specific behaviours of crew members and leaders con-
sistent with those espoused by HROs contributing to
performance across different types of fires.
In our theorizing about the three internal sources
of uncertainty (goal clarity, group familiarity and task Ta
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interdependence), we asserted that the effects would
be direct. And as stated above, the findings indeed
showed that familiarity and goal clarity positively influ-
ence performance. But a question arises as to whether
these factors might also play moderating roles.Thus, we
conducted post hoc analyses to ascertain the validity of
this line of thinking. We found modest support for
interaction effects between goal clarity and proactive
leader sensemaking (β = −.06, p < .05) and goal clarity
and anomalizing (β = −.08, p < .05). In both cases, goal
clarity attenuated the relationships between proactive
leader sensemaking, anomalizing and performance. To
further investigate the significant interaction effects, we
followed Aiken and West (1991) and plotted the sig-
nificant interactions at +/−SD. The relationships
between proactive leader sensemaking and group per-
formance and anomalizing and group performance are
stronger when goal clarity is low. This suggests that
proactive leader sensemaking and anomalizing may be
especially critical to performance when goal clarity is
low. However, this conclusion should be taken with
great caution as the magnitude of the interaction effects
on group performance was extremely small.We found
no support for other interactions with familiarity and
task interdependence.
5. Discussion
Almost 50 years ago, C. West Churchman voiced a
sentiment in the preface to The Systems Approach (1968,
p. xi), which remains relevant both theoretically as well
as practically. ‘The systems in which we live are far too
complicated as yet for our intellectual powers and tech-
nology to understand.’ If we take seriously Churchman’s
sentiments, that people and organizations live and act in
complex, volatile, uncertain and ambiguous situations,
which they cannot or do not understand perfectly
(Winner, 1975, p. 69), understanding what enables
capabilities for reliable performance under uncertainty
is critical. Our findings show that within the firefighting
contexts studied here, dual sets of behaviors enacted by
leaders and frontline workers are integral to effective
performance under uncertainty. Controlling for goal
clarity and group familiarity, higher performance
occurred when leaders and firefighters on the frontline
deeply engaged in their contexts and directed their
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Group Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Experience .06 .06 .06 .06
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Gender −.02 −.02 −.01 −.02
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Familiarity .06*** .06*** .06*** .06***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Goal clarity .43*** .39*** .38*** .37***
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Task interdependence .02 −.03 −.04 −.06
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Prescribed fire .11 .12 .14 .14
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Suppression fire −.05 −.05 −.05 −.04
(.07) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Supervisor −.13* −.13* −.16** −.15**
(.06) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Firefighter −.18* −.17 −.23** −.21*
(.07) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Support .04 .08 .03 .06
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Anomalizing .17*** .09*
(.04) (.04)
Proactive sensemaking .20*** .16***
(.04) (.04)
Constant 1.72*** 1.44*** 1.42*** 1.33***
(.27) (.27) (.26) (.27)
F 26.43*** 26.41*** 28.00*** 26.18***
R2 .33 .35 .36 .37
ΔR2 .02 .03 .04
n = 518.
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
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behaviours towards proactively searching for and
making sense of potential trouble spots.
The findings contribute to the literature in several
ways. First, and perhaps most importantly, our findings
provide strong support for the importance of particular
leadership behaviours in enabling performance under
trying conditions. Although there exist myriad case
studies showing the criticality of leader behaviours in
enabling reliable performance in dynamic conditions
(e.g., Bigley et al., 2001; Klein et al., 2006), large-sample
quantitative studies are rare. Similarly, few studies have
directly examined the micro-behaviours by which front-
line employees surface discrepant cues (see Barton
et al., 2009; Christianson et al., 2009; Gittell, 2002 for
notable exceptions).
Second, and relatedly, the findings reaffirm the impor-
tance of active sensemaking processes – both to
becoming aware of details, and also to understanding
what those details mean. The dangers of normalizing
(and conversely the benefits of anomalizing) have taken
centre stage since Vaughan’s (1996) reanalysis of the
1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster. But to our
knowledge, these ideas have received little further
empirical scrutiny. Indeed, our findings show the ben-
efits of proactively seeking to become alert to details
and avoiding oversimplifying them into familiar events.
Moreover, the act of looking for anomalies may actually
serve to trigger sensemaking (anomalizing and
sensemaking are positively associated). Anomalies
provide informational value (e.g., this part of the system
may be failing), and they also create an occasion for
sensemaking (Jett & George, 2003; Weick, 1995).
This represents a rethinking of sensemaking as we find
evidence that the discrepancies triggering further
sensemaking are not external events, but rather often
created by organizational actors as a means of effec-
tively navigating an uncertain context.
Third, our findings illustrate how organizations can
create a break in the momentum of action – momen-
tum, which otherwise may prevent renewed
sensemaking.This suggests that the very act of looking
for anomalies may be critical to the management of
uncertainty – not just because it provides important
information – but because the act of looking disrupts
the momentum of ongoing events, triggers doubt and
motivates renewed efforts to make sense. Initial sensing
processes are important, but a growing stream of work
suggests that organizations and their members often fail
to effectively manage unexpected surprises (recognize
and readjust or reorient in dynamic situations) because
the uninterrupted momentum of previous decisions
and ongoing actions hinders sensemaking (Barton et al.,
2009). Critically, if conditions change but sensemaking is
not renewed, interpretations of the emerging situation
are not updated and organizations are apt to remain
embedded in ineffective or inappropriate frameworks.
As a result, they are ill-equipped to adjust and respond
to changing conditions.
Finally, our findings suggest some of the micro-
processes that likely underlie organizational resilience.
Resilience refers to the ‘ability to absorb strain and
preserve (or improve) functioning despite the presence
of adversity . . . [and] to recover or bounce back from
untoward events’ (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 96). Enact-
ing resilience involves engaging with the reality of diffi-
cult situations and actively searching for and reporting
errors or other unexpected problems (Watts-Perotti &
Woods, 2009; Weick et al., 2007) rather than avoiding
or merely surviving adversity. Resilience also entails
cultivating and using resources (e.g., emotional, social,
technical, capital) flexibly to enact new, adaptive
responses (Caza & Milton, 2011; Coutu, 2002;
Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Kahn,
Barton, & Fellows, 2013; Powley, 2009; Rerup, 2001).
Moreover, research suggests leaders can play an impor-
tant role in creating a context for organizational resil-
ience (Beck & Plowman, 2009; Duhigg, 2012; Rajah &
Arvey, 2013). Organizations that face a constantly
uncertain and dynamic environment (like wildland
firefighting and HROs) cannot rely solely on strategies
aimed at reducing uncertainty. Rather, they must
perform reliably despite uncertainty. Our research sug-
gests specific practices through which organizations
proactively engage with difficult situations (rather than
avoid them entirely), integrate the reality of what is
happening (rather than hoping for the best) and
respond in flexible, adaptive ways.
Our findings should be considered in light of three
limitations. First, our data are cross-sectional so we
cannot ascertain the causality of our arguments. Future
research should use longitudinal designs to verify the
causal nature of our arguments. Second, our perfor-
mance outcome comes from the same source as the
independent variables.To ensure a large sample of fire-
fighters and fires, we needed to use a key informant
design and a perceptual measure of performance.A key
informant design should minimize risks of common
method bias because the informant is reporting on
collective rather than their own performance (minimiz-
ing social desirability pressures) and prior research sug-
gests that perceptual measures of performance are
consistent with more objective measures in such
circumstances (Glick et al., 1990). But future research
could validate our findings using different measures of
performance. Lastly, firefighting is a very unique uncer-
tain, ambiguous context, and it is unclear whether the
results would hold up in other settings. However, our
theorizing, as well as prior work on HROs (Weick et al.,
1999), suggests that processes of anomalizing and pro-
active leader sensemaking should generalize to con-
texts characterized by high levels of uncertainty and
ambiguity. Still, we encourage other researchers to
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further examine anomalizing and proactive leader
sensemaking in other contexts.
In this study, we have theorized and tested two novel
micro-level processes that enable rapid and ongoing
sensemaking under conditions of uncertainty. We
find that anomalizing and proactive leader sensemaking
play crucial roles in determining success of wildland
firefighting teams. We hope that it inspires further
examination of these two constructs and investigation
of this important context.
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Appendix A
Anomalizing
(1) We actively looked for instances of small things
going wrong to try to learn what was happening.
(2) People were rewarded or thanked for spotting
potential trouble spots.
(3) We were encouraged to express differing points of
view.
(4) We assessed each situation on its own rather than
assuming it would be similar to other situations
we’d experienced.
(5) When members had different opinions, we tried to
understand one another’s views.
Proactive leader sensemaking
(1) My boss actively sought input from a broad range of
folks when making decisions.
(2) My boss actively encouraged subordinates to ques-
tion decisions that didn’t make sense to them.
(3) My boss encouraged people to bring up potential
problems.
(4) My boss listened to the less experienced members
of my group when they brought up ideas or issues
(5) My boss actively listened when different views were
presented.
(6) My boss rejected or ignored input from others.
(7) My boss told us to pay attention to one another’s
input or ideas.
(8) My boss told us that our task required us to work
well together.
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